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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to capture the nature of interpretation of the 
commercial and legal phenomenon called shareholders´ agreements. It 
discusses particularly judicial interpretation in several European jurisdictions. 
The following research questions are posed: Are the shareholders agreements 
capable of inducing the informal change of corporate statutes? Is the prevailing 
character of the shareholders agreements contractual or corporate? Is it 
possible to conclude shareholders agreements dealing with voting rights 
exercise in the course of corporate management? The main focus is to give an 
overview of the prevailing trends of interpretation against the backdrop of 
comparison of the Czech and Slovak legal regulation with western Europe´s 
approach. The results showed that the explicate legal definition and regulation 
of shareholders agreements in Slovakia on the level of generally binding 
source of law is rather unique in Europe and that the broad acceptance of 
shareholders agreement in some western European countries (e.g. Germany, 
Austria and Netherlands) is very liberal and more extensive that their usual 
perception in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia.  
Keywords: Shareholders agreements, Statute, Corporation, Rules of 
interpretation 
 
Introduction 
Shareholders agreements (alternatively extra-statutory agreements or 
side letters, often abbreviated as “SHA”) represent a significant expression of 
autonomy of will and contractual freedom which are the two key values of 
private law in democratic society and free market economy. In the corporate 
world, we should always remember that the corporation represents a distinct 
legal personality, a newly created and formally independent subject of law that 
needs to be treated differently from its shareholders, who act as owners, as 
well as management professionals who conduct decision making and 
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controlling tasks over the business activities of the company (Bite, 
Jakuntaviciute, 2014, p. 109; Aliaj, 2014, p. 158).  
We can observe the increasing importance of these “side” agreements 
in the today´s situation when the corporate law regulation is getting more and 
more extensive, complicate and deep-rooted, it includes imperative norms 
where no distinct regulation between private parties is allowed.  
In terms of commercial and corporate legal regulation, these extra 
statutory agreements are among the most interesting aspects of interpretation 
of articles of association and statutes of limited liability companies and joint-
stock corporations. Their economic sense is to reach mutual understanding 
among particular stakeholders and therefore to create reasonable expectations 
regarding the future property and financial relations of shareholders to the 
company, e.g. in case of liquidation, winding-up, bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceedings.  
According to Stedman and Jones (1990, p. 53), we can define 
shareholders agreement as “an agreed superstructure to supplement and 
prevail over the articles which form the basic infrastructure.” Shareholders 
agreements are, as in Duffy (2008, p. 1) conceptualized as contracts from the 
legal point of view and are understood as “a reassertion of contractualism.” 
They present a useful tool bringing some additional flexibility to company´s 
legal affairs regulation. It is not surprising that this instrument is used more 
and more often in today´s business life. Nowadays the respect for contractual 
freedom is widely prevailing in market economies, while there are also older, 
classical views criticizing the existence of extra-statutory agreements for their 
lack of transparency, such as Schmitthoff (1970, p. 1).  
Elson (1967, p. 449) understands the classical purpose of shareholders 
agreements “to eliminate the tyranny of the majority.” Clearly, we understand 
side letters as an instrument to protect individual shareholders´ legal interests. 
Nevertheless, they can be applied for other various purposes. Just to name 
some of them (Duffy, 2008, p. 4): to establish or maintain balance of power 
among the company´s founders, directors or shareholders, to establish, 
maintain or amend the organizational structure of the company, to formulate 
priorities and business policy, to set rules for future cases, such as liquidation 
of the company or succession in case of death of shareholders – natural 
persons, to divide and elucidate roles in management and decision making, to 
attenuate or enforce mechanisms of internal control, to confer additional rights 
for shareholders that would not be legally enforceable without special 
concluded arrangement, to confer veto rights, to solve difficult communication 
situations and resolve disputes, to strengthen protection of special interests 
(e.g. additional rights for minority stakeholders or confidentiality of 
information that would otherwise be published under the rules of 
transparency). 
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This paper is aimed to discuss and answer several research questions: 
 Q1: Are the shareholders agreements capable of inducing the informal 
change of corporate statutes?  
 Q2: Is the prevailing character of the shareholders agreements 
“contractual” or “corporate”?  
 Q3: Is it possible to conclude shareholders agreements dealing with voting 
rights exercise in the course of corporate management? 
 
1.  The nature and legal effects of shareholders agreements  
We can divide the legal rules regulating corporations into two layers: 
there are some core norms represented by generally binding laws and some 
additional, not mandatory rules that can be legally disregarded or abrogated 
by different deriving regulation for particular cases (Ronovská, Havel, 2016). 
The core norms are contained in laws and in the parts of statutes that are 
prescribed by law, while the others can be found in non-mandatory parts of 
statutes and in shareholders agreements, concluded voluntarily by 
shareholders among themselves and/or with the corporation as a legal person.  
The statutes of corporations have indeed their contractual basis, they are 
concluded as a contract among all the founding shareholders of the newly 
established corporations. The business corporation can be together with 
traditionally Coase (1937) and more recently also Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
famously understood as a “nexus of obligations.” In the U.S. law, according 
to the Cornell University School of Law, we learn simply that “…a 
corporation is a legal entity created through the laws of its state of 
incorporation.” Also in the Czech law, it is usual that the corporation is 
founded by adopting its statute or concluding another contract, as it is 
stipulated by the wording of Section 125, the new Czech Civil Code, No. 
89/2012 Coll. 
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In other words, shareholders are entitled to reach an agreement within the 
general assembly meeting that derives from the rules written in the statute. As 
recognized in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, from 
2009, usually such a shareholders agreement is accepted as a “one-time” 
change, a particular derivation, while it is not universally accepted as a valid 
change of the statutory text having effect on future times.  
The legal standing of shareholders as subjects capable of influencing 
the rules governing corporation and its internal and external relations is getting 
stronger nowadays. In the EU, the shareholders have recently gained new 
rights on information about the business developments and other important 
features of their company, due to the Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement, which is now since 2019 in its full application.  
Shareholder agreements, “extra-statutory agreements” or “side letters” 
are a legal institute that strongly reflects the contractual nature of 
a corporation's statutes. Shareholders agreements, being a contract by their 
nature, do belong to the law of contracts inherently, but (with regards to their 
substantive content) with significant overlaps into corporate law. They are 
governed by the general rules on the formal requirements and validity 
conditions of the legal action as any other contract. Their contractual nature is 
reflected also when it comes to undue execution or breach of an agreement by 
one of its parties. The other affected parties may require compensation, 
liabilities or termination of the whole contract, depending on the particular 
national law regulation.  
Some large companies may develop their “boilerplate” sample texts 
for those agreements reusable for multiple consecutive occasions, while the 
precise form of a shareholders agreement is not legally prescribed and 
therefore can be drafted in any way that expresses the common will of the 
involved persons in a well understandable and unequivocal manner.  
It is important to mention that the shareholders agreements have some 
limitations. Under common law system, these extra-statutory agreements 
cannot deprive the corporation of the competence to change its own statute, 
even if the corporation itself would be party of such an agreement. This was 
expressed by the decision of the House of Lords in the UK, Russel v. Northern 
Bank Development Corporation Ltd. Similarly in Australia, any shareholder 
agreement cannot override statutory contract (Duffy, 2008, p. 8). 
The contractual substance of shareholder agreements is also reflected 
in the sphere of private international law, as the choice of law can be applied 
to them under Article 3 (1) of the Rome I Regulation. In case the choice of law 
has not been made, it is suitable to choose, under Article 4 (4) of this 
Regulation, the personal status of a commercial corporation as the law with 
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which the contract is most closely connected (Bříza, 2017, p. 108). Although 
shareholder agreements materially concern corporations (they could not be 
created without a corporation, otherwise they would not make sense), they do 
not fall within the exception written in  Article 1 (2) letter f) that the Rome I 
Regulation does not apply to matters governed by company law. They are not 
a basic, obligatory instrument of corporate law, but, on the contrary, an 
optional manifestation of will beyond the core structure of any corporation. 
Extra-statutory agreements constitute bilateral or multilateral legal action 
taken outside the statutes, although they address issues that might or may not 
be included in the statutes themselves, but shareholders have expressed their 
will to use less formal and more flexible framework of the shareholders 
agreement. These agreements have practical significance mostly in large 
capital companies with a large number of shareholders, i. e. predominantly in 
a public joint stock company and also in bigger private limited liability 
companies. 
Another very important reason to apply shareholders agreement in the 
todays´ corporate reality is the fact the articles of association and the statutes 
are compulsorily published in the collection of documents in commercial 
register, while informal agreements, although in writing, are not subject to the 
statutory disclosure obligation and thus allow shareholders to set their mutual 
future legal relationships in a binding manner without "informing" its creditors 
or other entities through commercial register. Perhaps this is why shareholders' 
agreements are not very often even reflected in decision-making activities of 
top civil and commercial courts.  
Amendments to shareholder agreements do not require the form of an 
authentic instrument (notarial deed) neither the decision of a general meeting 
or of all shareholders. Obviously, the transfer of shares does not automatically 
cause transfer rights and liabilities from shareholder agreement, since it only 
binds its contracting parties. To transfer rights and obligations, it would be 
necessary to change subjects of the agreement. The eventual recovery of 
liabilities from these agreements can also only take place on a contractual 
level, e.g. by arranging a contractual penalty. Shareholders agreements in 
general do not have to necessarily be concluded in a written form. On the other 
hand, we can only recommend written form in case of future disputes and 
therefore easier proof of evidence. However, this condition of written form is 
explicitly set in some national legal orders, e.g. in Slovakia.  
Shareholders agreements are a legal tool for articulating the various 
interests of associates and shareholders, which need to be counterbalanced by 
interpretation, so that partial agreements do not become manifestly contrary to 
the general interests of society. According to the Section 212 (2) of the Czech 
Civil Code, “if a member of a private corporation abuses his right to vote to 
the detriment of the whole, a court shall, on the application of the person who 
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has demonstrated legal interest, decide that the vote of that member is 
disregarded in a particular case. This right is extinguished, unless the 
application is filed within three months from the day on which the right to vote 
was abused.” 
A public joint-stock company is mostly a large company where 
different interests of shareholders and its groups are present. Therefore, partial 
agreements are an appropriate tool for their enforcement, because finding 
a generally acceptable compromise is sometimes nearly impossible. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to seek such an arrangement that the 
implementation of contractual freedom does not interfere with the 
fundamental issues of the organization of society and the mandatory 
provisions of the law. 
Figure 2: The most important issues being incorporated into the SHA 
related to the 
company´s structure 
and legal 
consequences for the 
company  
 the amendment of statutes  
 the change of the share capital and contributions 
 conditions of transfer of shares in favor of third persons  
related to the legal 
standing of the 
shareholders and 
their property rights  
 the voting on the shareholders meeting 
 support for candidates to the board of directors or other 
organ  
 the purchase or sale of the company´s undertaking  
Source: Csach, 2017 
 
Although shareholders agreement does not have to be written in all the 
countries, a manifested agreement is needed, while de facto acting in concert 
or having a shared interest among the partners is not sufficient, according to 
Csach (2017, p. 3). In other words, there are only shareholder agreements and 
there is no possibility of taking into account the practice of shareholders by 
analogy. On the other hand, in public international law, where the international 
treaty is the most important source of law today, the codified legal rules are 
different. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, 
which comprehensively regulates the process of concluding and applying 
international treaties, explicitly states in its Article 31 (3) on Interpretation of 
treaties that: "… shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation;…” 
The subsequent agreements and subsequent practice are both widely 
used in the current reality of international treaty law, as demonstrated by recent 
research by the UN International Law Commission, elaborated in 
a comprehensive Analytical Guide published in December 2018. In the public 
international law system, the large multilateral treaties where many States are 
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parties represent a very significant feature, while most of these treaties lack a 
purely obligatory character, because they are negotiated and ratified with 
intention of general norm-creation. 
 
2.  The private law in the Czech and Slovak Republics  
This contribution is intended particularly to compare the legal 
regulation of shareholders agreement and its interpretation in the Czech 
Republic and in Slovakia.  
To present the current state of affairs, let us briefly revise the recent 
historical development: After the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation 
on 31 December 1992, the two successor republics decided to overtake the 
previous federal legal order that was at that time equally valid for both nations. 
Since the establishment of two independent republics, each of them developed 
its legal system with improvements, amendments and removal of previously 
federative laws on its own. Therefore, it is not unusual that originally the same 
legal text is currently in force in both republics but with some amendments 
that differ in comparison of the Czech and Slovak version. Another possibility 
is that one of the successor states continues to use the predecessor´s federative 
laws with necessary updates while the other one has developed completely 
new set of regulations.  
The private law in the Czech Republic was recently principally 
recodified – the new Civil Code, containing also unified law of contracts 
relevant also for business, commerce and foreign trade use, and the new 
Commercial Corporations Act, were adopted in 2012 and are in force since 
January 1, 2014. However, some established principles continue to be shared 
with the previous legal regulation containing separate Commercial Code 
adopted in 1991 and establishing special regulation of commercial contacts 
within corporate and business relations. The Commercial Code was annulled 
and replaced to a significant extent by the comprehensive new Civil Code. On 
the other hand, in Slovakia, this Commercial Code that was adopted at the 
beginning of economic transformation in 1991 is still valid and has undergone 
some development that did not happen in the Czech Republic where already 
the recodified private law is in force. At the beginning of this year 2019, it has 
been exactly 5 years of our new principle private law regulation and its 
practical implementation.  
When it comes to interpretation, the core value of private contract law 
in the Czech Republic and other democratic states is the autonomy of will, 
accompanied with the liberty of contract. This means that it is possible to 
create every extra-statutory particular and deriving regulation that is not 
contrary to generally binding law or its leading principles. In the Czech law, 
we can find these leading interpretative principles codified in the introductive 
part of the new Civil Code, No. 89/2012 Coll., in force since January 1, 2014. 
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We can truly understand this freedom as a cornerstone of modern democratic 
private law systems.  
The Slovak law regulates shareholder agreements explicitly as of 1 
January 2017, when this was incorporated into the Commercial Code, Act No. 
513/1991 Coll. A new Section 66c regulating "agreements between 
shareholders" was inserted. The agreement must be in writing and must govern 
the mutual rights and obligations of shareholders arising from their 
participation in corporation. Furthermore, the provision contains an illustrative 
list of possible issues covered by these agreements. It is expressly stated that 
the contradiction of the decision of the company body with shareholder 
agreement does not invalidate such a decision. However, a contrary opinion 
was expressed earlier by German and Austrian courts: according to them, 
shareholders agreement can induce invalidity of the decision taken by 
corporation´s organ. This appeared in the judgment of the German Supreme 
Court from 1983, and similarly in the judgement of the Austrian Supreme 
Court from 1999. 
Table 1: The timeframe of the company law in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
1 January 1992 1 January 1993 1 January 2014 1 January 2017 
 
The Commercial 
Code (Act No. 
513/1991) enters 
into force in 
Czechoslovakia at 
the beginning of 
economic and 
political 
transformation 
towards capitalism 
and free market. 
The end of federal 
Czechoslovakia – 
the newly 
established Czech 
and Slovak 
republics emerge 
while 
simultaneously 
adopting all the 
previous federal 
legislation. 
In the Czech 
Republic, the 
overall 
recodification of the 
private law came 
into effect. New 
Civil Code replaces 
the repealed old 
Civil Code and also 
the Commercial 
Code.  
In Slovakia, an 
amendment of 
Commercial Code 
brings explicit 
definition of 
shareholders 
agreements.  
  
Both of these 
previous private law 
codes still stay in 
effect in Slovakia.   
No explicit 
definition of 
shareholders 
agreement in the 
Czech Republic, 
only general 
legislative 
provisions can 
apply.  
the same legislation  
in CZ and SK 
the differing legislation  
in CZ and SK 
Source: Elaborated by the author on the base of laws published in the official sources. 
 
The legislator thus resolves a possible contradiction between such dual 
manifestations of will with different content affecting the business 
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corporation. A formalized decision of a company body takes precedence over 
an "informal" shareholder agreement that is legally binding only between its 
parties. Therefore, we can conclude that even a possible discrepancy between 
the shareholder agreement and the text of the articles of association cannot 
cause the articles of association to be invalidated, but such a situation should 
be interpreted as a derogation that binds only the parties to the agreement as a 
contractual obligation. 
Further details of shareholder agreements, as far as issues of transfer 
of shares are concerned, are governed by the Slovak (originally Czechoslovak) 
Commercial Code in Sections 202w to 202z. Some shareholder agreements 
are in Slovakia explicitly prohibited under Section 186a of the Commercial 
Code. These are mainly agreements binding shareholders on certain manner 
of exercising voting rights, incl. compliance with instructions from company 
bodies and cases with prior arranged compensation. This explicit ban has been 
abolished in the Czech Republic with recodification, but in the context of a 
public joint-stock company, we must not forget Section 244 (2) of the 
Commercial Corporations Act, according to which “…any legal act aimed at 
obtaining an unjust advantage in favor of a shareholder at the expense of the 
company or other shareholders shall be disregarded, unless provided 
otherwise in this Act or unless it would be harmful to any third person who 
relied in good faith on such legal act.” 
We find it useful that the Slovak legislature has explicitly defined the 
essential elements of shareholder agreements. The contemporary Czech 
private law, on the other hand, neither explicitly regulates nor prohibits 
shareholder agreements. The same is true in some other European legal 
systems, such as the English and German ones. Under English law, the 
corporate law is codified by the Companies Act from 2006. In German law, 
there are specific laws for each type of business corporations, such as the 
Limited Liability Company Act or the Act on Public Joint Stock Company. In 
Section 136 (2) of the German Public Joint Stock Company Act, there is a 
prohibition of agreements about the manner in which voting rights are 
exercised, about binding shareholders to vote in the opinion of the company, 
board of directors or supervisory board. Such agreements would be invalid. 
In the light of the autonomy of the expressed will and contractual 
freedom, the German Supreme Court in 2010 concluded that a decision of a 
general meeting of a company which does not meet the requirements for its 
validity prescribed by law or the articles of association may be regarded as 
a manifested agreement of the shareholders. However, Csach (2017, p. 31) 
notes that such contractual freedom cannot be understood as absolute and it is 
not possible to automatically consider any invalid decision of a general 
meeting to be a shareholder agreement that itself has certain legal 
consequences. 
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The above ban on some kind of shareholder agreements, how it works 
in Germany, in Slovakia and how it used to work also in our country before 
the recodification, is not universally shared in other European legal systems. 
E.g. according to the Dutch case-law, shareholder agreements on voting rights 
are valid (Van Ween, 2017, p. 229). On the other hand, the subsequent vote in 
conflict with the previously concluded agreement cannot invalidate the vote - 
the vote is valid for the company, even if it has departed from the previously 
concluded agreement (of course, this does not affect any individual claims for 
damages). In this context, we can remind the previously mentioned fact that 
the new Czech Civil Code allows under Section 212 (2) to disregard the vote 
resulting from the misuse of voting rights to the detriment of the corporation 
as a whole (and only on the basis of a court decision at the request of the 
interested party filed in three-months period). 
Today's commercial law respects the expressed will of the 
shareholders and considers the agreement of all shareholders as a materially 
comparable expression of will as if it were a decision of the shareholders at 
the general meeting. This also applies to changes to the articles of association, 
i. e. the range of issues that the statute deals with in some way, but all the 
shareholders have agreed on a preferred other arrangement when concluding 
the informal extra-statutory agreement. This statement is supported by the 
judicial interpretation by the Czech Supreme Court (2007). 
In other words, a valid shareholder agreement of all shareholders may 
be contrary to the company´s statutes, but not contrary to the generally binding 
(both national and European) law. The same conclusion, elaborated by 
Šuleková (2017, p. 255 – 256) regarding the admissibility of amendments to 
the articles of association by agreement of all shareholders is directed by the 
English legislation. German case law (the judgments of the German Supreme 
Court from 1980s) even allows for a possible relative nullity of a general 
meeting resolution if it is contrary to extra-statutory agreement adopted by all 
the shareholders. 
 
3.  The difference between statutory and extra-statutory regulation  
The company´s statutes and shareholders agreements form a set of 
rules that relate to the functioning of a commercial corporation and constitutes 
its legal background, which should be considered as a whole set of rules and 
courts should avoid artificial distinction when conducting interpretation, as 
Royal Court in London stated in 2013 in case McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) 
Investments Ltd & Ors.  
The difference between the amendment of the statute and the 
acceptance of the agreement of all shareholders that have divergent content 
from the wording of the statute is thus mainly due to the variations in the 
formal process in which the concerned legal act is formed. If we applied a 
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logical interpretation with respect to systematic organization of corporate law 
as a whole, we would identify significant changes in content: extra-statutory 
agreements obviously cannot regulate the principal, fundamental 
characteristics of a commercial company such as its business name, registered 
office, share capital, etc. Of course, the legal effects vis-à-vis third parties are 
also different – while statutes bind all shareholders and the company itself and 
members of its bodies, shareholder agreements bring contractual obligation 
only to entities that have concluded this agreement with each other.  
For instance, as the Czech Supreme Court stated in 2005, by way of 
a secondary arrangement, a pre-emptive purchase right may be established for 
future cases of selling shares, even if the objective law does not regulate such 
an institute. In terms of interpretation, according to Ronovská and Havel 
(2016), it is logical that statutes require a higher degree of objectivity of 
interpretation than its subsidiary agreement, where subjective interpretation 
may outweigh its wider personal scope. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch law attaches great importance to shareholder 
agreements and even attributes to them the so-called "corporate effect", i. e. 
that these agreements also have an effect on the company itself, and moreover, 
on other people who are involved in the organization of the corporation and 
who also have to follow these agreements. This opinion was found in the 
Dutch Supreme Court´s judgments from 1960s and also from recent years. 
Under the British law, according to the House of Lords decision in Russel v. 
Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd., the shareholders can agree 
about how they will exercise their voting rights in the future. This we can 
understand as a wide delimitation of allowed material scope of extra-statutory 
parallel regulation.  
 
4.  Modelling  
According to our research, it is not possible to employ quantitative 
research methods on the issue of shareholders agreements because 
as mentioned above these side agreements are not usually published (although 
some exceptions exist, e. g. with regards to companies under state and public 
ownership being under particular duties to ensure general transparency in 
relation to public budgets spending). The lack of necessity to publish the 
concluded agreement, being a commercial contract with contractual binding 
force, is perceived as a great advantage for parties not willing to let their 
concluded agreement become known by creditors, business partners or wider 
public. However, this causes the impossibility to capture exact numbers of 
these agreements being concluded in certain times and jurisdictions. As 
a result, we therefore cannot now measure their economic effectivity and 
impact on business environment by quantitative models.  
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This is quite different from the structure and proportion of ownership 
of the companies with shares listed on stock exchange. The information on 
ownership structure is in the majority of jurisdictions obligatory to be 
published and the same applies for the economic performance of the 
company´s business. Therefore, it enables researchers to develop econometric 
models evaluating company´s economic effectivity in dependence on 
ownership structure (Isik – Soykan, 2013).  
The presence of large shareholder, i. e. one owner with influence over 
the vast majority of the company´s shares, proved to have positive impact on 
business performance, because this large shareholder is directly interested and 
motivated in raising the value and economic performance of the firm – 
forming part of his assets (Isik – Soykan, 2013, p. 34). The participation of 
shareholders and institutional investors can be measured also in relation to 
their impact on corporate governance (Huang – Xie, 2016). 
 The structured results of our qualitative research, based on three 
concrete research questions, are presented in this table:  
 Table 2: The nature and legal effects of shareholders agreements 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
 
 
Country  Q1: the capability of 
changing the 
corporate statutes  
Q2: the prevailing 
nature of SHA  
Q3: the legality of 
voting rights to be 
regulated by SHA  
the Czech Republic  
accepted (as a unique 
derogation)  
contractual  it 
cannot cause invali-
dity of corporate 
body decision 
previously banned 
by law  
Slovakia 
accepted  contractual  it 
cannot cause invali-
dity of corporate 
body decision 
banned by law  
Germany  
accepted  corporate  it can 
cause invalidity of 
corporate body 
decision  
banned by law 
Austria  
accepted  corporate  it can 
cause invalidity of 
corporate body 
decision 
N/A 
the Netherlands  accepted  corporate accepted  
the United 
Kingdom  
accepted (but it cannot 
deprive the corporation 
from the power to 
change its statutes)  
corporate accepted   
RESULTS 
the interpretation is 
the same  
the interpretation 
differs  
the interpretation 
differs  
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Conclusion 
In summary, shareholder agreements are respected as a form of 
expression of the identical free and autonomous will of the shareholders to the 
extent that they can validly replace the form of expression of will required by 
legal order to amend the statutes. It is also important to stress that the extra-
statutory regulation can only be based on an agreement, not any concerting 
and settled shareholder practice, which has itself no legally relevant effects. 
We showed that the Slovak legislation is particularly interesting and inspiring 
in that it explicitly defines the shareholder agreement and covers its essential 
requirements, especially the written form which is not required in some other 
countries, e.g. common law jurisdictions.  
In the Central European area (in the German, Slovak and, until 
recently, Czech legislation), it is usual to define the prohibition of certain types 
of agreements that oblige shareholders to exercise their voting rights in 
a certain manner, while in some liberal Western European countries, such the 
United Kingdom or Netherlands, voting shareholder agreements are also valid 
- their sphere of applicability is even wider. One of the strongest proofs of the 
significance of the shareholders agreements is the invalidity of the 
shareholders meeting resolution if it is contrary to the previous shareholders 
agreement.  
Our study led to the comparison of several European jurisdictions with 
diverse social, political and philosophical backgrounds that now share the 
internal market of the EU. We evidenced the differing approaches towards the 
issue of shareholders agreements. The first research question turned the same 
results, in sense that in all the analyzed countries the shareholders agreements 
are able to change the statutes. On the other hand, the other two analyzed 
issues showed divergent interpretation. In Western Europe, it is common to 
perceive any “side” agreement as a tool not only to amend the statute but even 
to exercise voting rights in fact, while in Central Europe, the mainstream is 
not to allow the “side” agreement cause the invalidity of the corporate organ´s 
resolution, therefore assigning only a limited validity for such and informally 
expressed common will of private subjects.  
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